(FORTUNE Magazine) – U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, STABLE IN RECENT YEARS, MAY soon be replaced by sustained political conflict. This has less to do with the political philosophies of Jefferson and Mao than with China's need for a steady supply of energy and raw materials--a need that is pulling China into deeper political involvement in regions where Washington has long enjoyed a near monopoly on international influence.

The numbers are staggering. Having become a net importer of oil only in 1994, China now imports half its daily consumption. Its demand for oil surged nearly 40% in the first half of 2004, accounting for roughly one-third of the increase in world oil consumption. If its oil demand grows at an average rate of 7% a year (as it has since 1990), China will be consuming 21 million barrels a day by 2022--equaling the amount currently used in the U.S.

That growing demand has taken China to places like Iran, which has put it in direct conflict with U.S. efforts to force Iran to renounce its ambition to become a nuclear weapons state. In November, China signed the largest energy deal in Iran's history--an agreement to buy 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas over 30 years. Iran will also export 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day to China once Sinopec, a Chinese state-owned energy company, has developed Iran's Yadavaran field. The deal is valued at $70 billion.

Shortly after the agreement, Beijing made clear it would oppose any attempt in the UN Security Council to impose comprehensive sanctions in response to Iran's failure to satisfy the UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, that it remains in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran has now negotiated a watered-down deal with three European countries over its nuclear program, a deal Washington calls inadequate. But China's lucrative new energy contract ensures it won't allow the Security Council to be used to punish Iranian noncompliance.

China's search for energy supplies has also complicated Washington's efforts to stop what the Bush administration has called a state-sponsored genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. Southern Darfur is rich in oil, and China National Petroleum holds the largest concession there. China whittled down U.S.-sponsored warnings to Sudan to stop the violence in Darfur, changing Security Council threats to "take further action" against Khartoum to the weaker "consider taking additional measures." Even with the change, China abstained.

The demand for commodities has sharpened China's traditional political rivalries in Asia as well. There have been recent conflicts with Japan in the East China Sea and with Vietnam in the South China Sea, which has oil and gas reserves. Conflicts among China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan over sovereignty aren't new. But they are intensifying as China's aggressiveness grows with its demand for energy. China and the U.S. are also likely to compete for oil in Russia. The U.S. wants to reduce its energy dependence on Persian Gulf states by using cooperative pipeline projects to move oil through Siberia to Murmansk, where it can be put in tankers and shipped across the Pacific. But China also wants that oil to fuel its economy.

Even in the Western Hemisphere, China is making its economic presence felt. Sinopec has expressed interest in investing in oil sands operations in western Canada. China's Minmetals has bid to acquire the Canadian nickel mining company Noranda. And in South America, Chile now exports more to China than to the U.S. China has signed energy exploration deals with Argentina and trade pacts with Brazil, and it is expanding commercial relationships throughout Latin America. Under an agreement reached last month, Chinese companies will gain development rights to 15 oilfields in Venezuela and will be allowed to build refineries there. It's not simply the more intense competition in America's backyard that worries Washington; China views these resources strategically and often pays more than fair market price to tie them up. And China's involvement in the hemisphere goes beyond natural resources. In addition to sending military advisors to Venezuela, China has reportedly been operating an electronic intelligence center in Cuba since1999.

Yet Washington won't be able to look to its Cold War rivalry with the Soviets for historical lessons in global conflict management. That's because the U.S.-China competition isn't built on the same zero-sum model. Despite their rivalry, the two countries depend on each other for success--even economic stability. Chinese demand is a stimulant for the global economic growth on which American prosperity depends. And China, because it exports so much to the U.S., has built up a trade surplus that is invested largely in U.S. Treasuries. A quick withdrawal could raise interest rates here and undercut economic growth.

The Bush administration seems unprepared for the challenge China poses. Conventional wisdom has long held that China never entangles itself in international disputes that do not directly threaten its national interest. The Chinese haven't sought the kind of global influence that the British, Japanese, French, or Americans have. But it's dangerous to assume that China will be bound by history, particularly now that its national interest demands that it scour the globe for energy suppliers.

So how can this emerging conflict over resources be managed? First, Washington must recognize that China plays a different role in the world than the Soviet Union did. Trying to punish China just won't work: An economic crisis there will hurt the U.S. as well. Rather, the Bush administration should be thinking of ways to help China, and the easiest way it can do that is to make China more energy efficient. If China isn't compelled by its energy demand to take actions that bring Beijing into conflict with Washington, both sides win.

Among other things, Washington can help China develop alternative sources of energy, including hydropower, natural gas, and, to a lesser extent, nuclear, solar, and wind power. American companies that provide China with such technology can also benefit. And the U.S. can help China build an Asian strategic oil reserve so that it is less vulnerable to sudden shocks in world oil markets. Without financing from the West, it could be years before China is able to stock even a 90-day emergency supply of oil.

Such moves could lead to long overdue demand-side coordination in the global energy market. Instead of considering China a strategic competitor and Saudi Arabia a partner, the U.S should recognize that the interests of two of the world's largest oil importers are more in harmony than are the interests of the biggest oil buyer and the biggest seller. Aligning U.S. and Chinese interests would allow them both to better resist profiteering in world energy markets.

Unfortunately, if China's foreign policy frustrates Washington's efforts to protect U.S. national interests, lawmakers are liable to fall back on a familiar counterstrategy: a Cold War containment policy. But persuading U.S. lawmakers to put aside Cold War zero-sum thinking in its relations with China and to begin to see China as a strategic partner in the world economy is a challenge worth accepting.

IAN BREMMER is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, and a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute.