Trump aide Monica Crowley plagiarized thousands of words in Ph.D. dissertation
Conservative commentator Monica Crowley, who is slated to serve in a top national security communications role in Donald Trump's presidential administration, plagiarized thousands of words of her 2000 dissertation for her Columbia University Ph.D., a CNN KFile review has found.
On Monday, Politico reported that it found more than a dozen examples of plagiarism in Crowley's Ph.D. dissertation. CNN's KFile has found nearly 40 lengthy instances of Crowley lifting paragraphs from numerous sources, including several scholarly texts, the Associated Press, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
The revelation comes on the heels of another CNN KFile investigation, which found more than 50 instances of plagiarism in Crowley's 2012 book, "What The (Bleep) Just Happened." On Tuesday, the book's publisher, HarperCollins, announced that it would stop selling the book until "the author has the opportunity to source and revise the material."
Crowley's first plagiarism scandal came in 1999, the year before she submitted her dissertation. After The New York Times reported a reader found that a column she wrote in the Wall Street Journal strongly resembled a 1988 article in the neoconservative magazine Commentary, a Journal editor said that the paper would not have published her piece if it had known of the parallels. Crowley denied the charge but acknowledged that the language is similar.
Neither Crowley, nor the Trump transition team, responded to requests for comment.
Columbia also declined to comment in a statement, saying that all reviews of University research were kept confidential.
"We have no comment on Monica Crowley's dissertation, which was submitted in 2000 and is publicly available," the statement said. "The University's process for addressing concerns raised about University research preserves the confidentiality of any review, and even the fact of a review's existence is confidential while it is underway. Columbia is committed to upholding the very highest standards of integrity and credibility in academic research."
Trump has tapped Crowley, a syndicated radio host, columnist, author, and longtime Fox News contributor to be his senior director of strategic communications for the National Security Council.
The Trump transition team's statement announcing Crowley's selection hailed her reputation as a scholar.
It said, "Dr. Crowley, a renowned scholar who holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University, is a foreign affairs and political analyst for the Fox News Channel. She is also a New York Times bestselling author and a columnist and online opinion editor of The Washington Times."
In her dissertation on America's China policy under Truman and Nixon, entitled "Clearer Than Truth," Crowley, whose Ph.D. is in international relations, lifted multiple passages from Eric Larson's 1996 book, "Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations." She also repeatedly plagiarized James Chace's 1998 book, "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World," as well as a 1982 book by Yale's John Lewis Gaddis called "Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War." Crowley's dissertation also contains passages taken from a 1996 book by Thomas Christensen of Princeton, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958.
Crowley cited these and other sources in footnotes at various points in her dissertation, but often failed to include citations or to properly cite sources in sections where she copied their wording verbatim or closely paraphrased it.
Crowley's dissertation includes plagiarized paragraphs from commentary in a 1998 collection of transcripts of Henry Kissinger's declassified conversations with other diplomats and world leaders. She also lifted material from Henry Kissinger's 1979 memoirs, using Kissinger's language to summarize Kissinger's descriptions of the Nixon administration's thought processes without quoting him.
Crowley's dissertation contains parts of a January 1999 Associated Press article copied word-for-word.
Other sources she plagiarized include an August 1977 issue of the Libertarian Review, a 1982 report by Brookings fellow Raymond L. Garthoff, a 1971 academic article by John E. Mueller, and a 1971 article in the magazine Foreign Affairs.
Crowley, page 168
Mueller found a "rally in support at the
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be a
“long, bloody affair.” The figure below shows the
course of public support for the war. American
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support for
and opposition to
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression; support
for the war was
down to hard-core supporters co
and fell only
an additional ten
points thereafter. The principal reasons for
continued support for the war were, not
surprisingly, the reasons established for American
grand strategy by Truman two decades before:
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.
The Roper Center's February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was the
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.60
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson (and later,
the Nixon) administration
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed to the polarization of
opinion. For example, while 29 percent of those
Gallup polled in November 1965 thought the war
would end in a victory for the United States, 30
percent expected a stalemate or compromise, and 10
percent expected a very lengthy conflict. By May
1966, 54 percent expected the war to result in a
compromise, and by February 1968, 61 percent
expected such an outcome.
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may have also
diminished
over the course of the war.
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be a
“long, bloody affair.” The figure below shows the
course of public support for the war. American
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support for
and opposition to
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression; support
for the war was
down to hard-core supporters co
and fell only
an additional ten
points thereafter. The principal reasons for
continued support for the war were, not
surprisingly, the reasons established for American
grand strategy by Truman two decades before:
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.
The Roper Center's February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was the
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.60
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson (and later,
the Nixon) administration
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed to the polarization of
opinion. For example, while 29 percent of those
Gallup polled in November 1965 thought the war
would end in a victory for the United States, 30
percent expected a stalemate or compromise, and 10
percent expected a very lengthy conflict. By May
1966, 54 percent expected the war to result in a
compromise, and by February 1968, 61 percent
expected such an outcome.
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may have also
diminished
over the course of the war.
Mueller found a “rally” in support at the
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be
“a long, bloody affair.” 51 In the event, U.S.
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support
and opposition for
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression—support
for the war was generally
down to hard-core supporters
and fell only perhaps
an additional 10
points thereafter. The principal reasons that
lay behind
continued support for the war were
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.53
The Roper Center’s February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson and Nixon
administrations
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed to polarization.55
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may also have
diminished for many leaders and members of the
public
over the course of the war.56 For others,
however, the stakes may have increased.
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be
“a long, bloody affair.” 51 In the event, U.S.
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support
and opposition for
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression—support
for the war was generally
down to hard-core supporters
and fell only perhaps
an additional 10
points thereafter. The principal reasons that
lay behind
continued support for the war were
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.53
The Roper Center’s February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson and Nixon
administrations
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed to polarization.55
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may also have
diminished for many leaders and members of the
public
over the course of the war.56 For others,
however, the stakes may have increased.
Crowley, page 69
Larson, 1996
Public support is a fluid dynamic: given
information and analysis by leaders and elites,
the public constantly weighs
the benefits and prospects of
success against the likely and actual costs and
then reaches
a determination as to
whether the likely
outcome is worth the sacrifice.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated. Traditionally,
U.S. military operations have been
explained and justified both in normative terms
(stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
at stake) and pragmatic terms (stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
involvement.) Further,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that are involved
establishes a connection between the objectives
of the
operation and the larger purpose behind it.
information and analysis by leaders and elites,
the public constantly weighs
the benefits and prospects of
success against the likely and actual costs and
then reaches
a determination as to
whether the likely
outcome is worth the sacrifice.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated. Traditionally,
U.S. military operations have been
explained and justified both in normative terms
(stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
at stake) and pragmatic terms (stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
involvement.) Further,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that are involved
establishes a connection between the objectives
of the
operation and the larger purpose behind it.
In short, support can be thought of as a
constant rebalancing of
the benefits and prospects for
success against the likely and actual costs—and
a determination of
whether the
outcome is judged worth the costs—all informed
by leaders and experts.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated. First, as a practical matter,
U.S. military operations are typically
explained and justified both in normative
terms—stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
that are at stake—and pragmatic
terms—stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
intervention. Second,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that are engaged
establishes a connection between the objectives
of a given
operation and the larger purposes it is
promoting.
constant rebalancing of
the benefits and prospects for
success against the likely and actual costs—and
a determination of
whether the
outcome is judged worth the costs—all informed
by leaders and experts.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated. First, as a practical matter,
U.S. military operations are typically
explained and justified both in normative
terms—stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
that are at stake—and pragmatic
terms—stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
intervention. Second,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that are engaged
establishes a connection between the objectives
of a given
operation and the larger purposes it is
promoting.
Crowley, page 170
Larson, 1996
As the Sino-Soviet split became more apparent, the costs of Vietnam rose, leading to a waning of public support, an intensification of the public’s suspicion, and the emergence of increasingly skeptical criticism of the strategic importance of Southeast Asia. In fact, concern about the impact on U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal seemed to be the dominant concern for realists. As early as 1966, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau argued that defending Vietnam to contain communism was a misapplication of the containment doctrine, even though it was a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine. Kennan was, however, concerned about the ramifications for U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal.
Seyom Brown suggests that, as the Sino-Soviet split became more apparent and a multipolar world began to emerge and as the costs of Vietnam rose, increasingly skeptical criticism of the strategic importance of Indochina emerged. In fact, concern about the impact on U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal seemed to become the dominant concern for realists. As early as 1966, such realists as George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau were arguing that defending Vietnam to contain communism was a misapplication of the containment doctrine. Kennan was, however, concerned about the ramifications for U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal.
Crowley, page 172
Larson, 1996
And according to Paul M. Kattenburg, the domestic consensus based upon containment of the Soviet Union and communism had been fundamentally shaken by 1969.
According to Paul M. Kattenburg, the domestic consensus based upon containment of the Soviet Union and communism had been fundamentally shaken by 1969.
Crowley, page 267
Larson, 1996
The Fulbright hearings of early 1966 had been
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing it, thereby
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring additional
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
showing little sign
of progress, and the Democrats were getting the
blame.
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing it, thereby
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring additional
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
showing little sign
of progress, and the Democrats were getting the
blame.
The Fulbright hearings in early 1966 had been
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing the war, thus
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring further
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
yielding little evidence
of progress.
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing the war, thus
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring further
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
yielding little evidence
of progress.
Crowley, page 278
Larson, 1996
Three years before Nixon took office, fewer than
four in ten Americans believed that the
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given this already
limited willingness to accept Korea-level
casualties, it was
remarkable that
Johnson and Nixon
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea.
By the time of the Tet offensive in early
1968,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
four in ten Americans believed that the
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given this already
limited willingness to accept Korea-level
casualties, it was
remarkable that
Johnson and Nixon
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea.
By the time of the Tet offensive in early
1968,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
Early in the war, fewer than four in ten
expressed a belief that a
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given this
limited willingness to accept Korea-like
casualties in a war in Vietnam, it is
remarkable that the
Johnson and Nixon administrations
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea. In the event,
by the time of Tet,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
expressed a belief that a
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given this
limited willingness to accept Korea-like
casualties in a war in Vietnam, it is
remarkable that the
Johnson and Nixon administrations
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea. In the event,
by the time of Tet,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
Crowley, page 281
Larson, 1996
Even with that flexibility, however, it was clear that the increasing costs came to be judged by majorities as being incommensurate with the expected and actual benefits of the war and its prospects for success.
In Vietnam, the increasing costs came to be judged by majorities as being incommensurate with the expected benefits of the war and its prospects for success.
Crowley, page 352
Larson, 1996
By mid-1969, there was a general acceptance
by the Nixon administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization. Thus
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and members of the
administration
could move to support it.
At the same time, however,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
by the Nixon administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization. Thus
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and members of the
administration
could move to support it.
At the same time, however,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
As Mueller (1973, p.101) summarized the process
after 1968: [With] the ultimate acceptance in
mid-1969
by the Nixon Administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization . . .
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and
administration followers
could move to its support.
At the same time, of course,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
after 1968: [With] the ultimate acceptance in
mid-1969
by the Nixon Administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization . . .
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and
administration followers
could move to its support.
At the same time, of course,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
Crowley, page 101
James Chace, "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World,” 1998
By modifying the China aid bill to allow the unexpended portion to be used to continue to aid the KMT, Congress had made it impossible for Acheson to abandon support for the Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with the communists based on their effective control of the government of China. Congress’ action was, of course, a reaction to the success of the anti-communist rhetorical campaign being waged by the administration, but it was met by the unintended consequence of Mao declaring on June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets that he was not an Asian Tito, he stated, “We must lean to one side...Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.”23 Mao’s announcement may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but for months before his statement, the Chinese communist leadership had been giving mixed signals; as Chou Enlai had stated: “It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union,” but he also argued that “the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.”
In effect, Congress was making it impossible for Acheson to abandon support of the Chinese Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with Beijing on the basis of who represented the effective government of China. No sooner had the aid bill been modified than Mao Zedong declared on June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets that he was not about to become an Asian Tito, he asserted, “We must lean to one side…. Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.” 25 Mao’s decision may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but the way had been foreshadowed by Zhou Enlai a few months earlier when he said: “It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union.” However, “The Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.”
Crowley, page 102
Chace, 1998
Ten days after Mao’s speech, he
dispatched Chen Mingshu
to explain his thinking to
Ambassador Stuart.
In mid-July 1949, Chen told
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was geared for
domestic consumption and that the CCP
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese communist
regime. Trade was the key issue. The
administration
saw Sino-American trade as a way to pry
the Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Chou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin. (Simultaneously,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the NATO
treaty,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the rapidly developing cold war.)
dispatched Chen Mingshu
to explain his thinking to
Ambassador Stuart.
In mid-July 1949, Chen told
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was geared for
domestic consumption and that the CCP
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese communist
regime. Trade was the key issue. The
administration
saw Sino-American trade as a way to pry
the Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Chou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin. (Simultaneously,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the NATO
treaty,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the rapidly developing cold war.)
In fact, ten days after Mao’s “lean to one
side” statement, Mao
dispatched Chen Mingshu, described as a “fellow
traveler of the Communists” from the Nationalists,
to explain his thinking to the American
ambassador in Nanjing.
In mid-July 1949 Chen told Ambassador
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was designed “for
his own Party.” The Chinese Communists
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese Communist
regime. 27 If Mao and Zhou were moving closer to
Stalin, they nonetheless hoped to have good
relations with the United States, which could
eventually lead to recognition. In this respect,
their policies briefly converged with what Truman
and Acheson were trying to do. The Americans
saw Sino-American trade as a means of weaning
away
the Chinese Communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Zhou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin. At the same time,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the Cold War.
side” statement, Mao
dispatched Chen Mingshu, described as a “fellow
traveler of the Communists” from the Nationalists,
to explain his thinking to the American
ambassador in Nanjing.
In mid-July 1949 Chen told Ambassador
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was designed “for
his own Party.” The Chinese Communists
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese Communist
regime. 27 If Mao and Zhou were moving closer to
Stalin, they nonetheless hoped to have good
relations with the United States, which could
eventually lead to recognition. In this respect,
their policies briefly converged with what Truman
and Acheson were trying to do. The Americans
saw Sino-American trade as a means of weaning
away
the Chinese Communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Zhou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin. At the same time,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the Cold War.
Crowley, page 105
Chace, 1998
In the Letter,
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of aid.” Emphasizing
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.”
The Letter was essentially a political document
meant to portray
the Chinese communists as chumps
of Moscow; it stated that the CCP
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia,” though,
according to John Melby, who drafted
the White Paper, Acheson did not agree with
this assessment but approved the language
to appease the China bloc.38 But
by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue his
preferred policy of eventual
recognition, even if Mao were to
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. Even at this point,
Acheson was still searching for a way to keep
apart Moscow and Beijing. He apparently
believed that the CCP
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of its
own people and those of the Soviet Union.
By accusing Mao of submitting
to Stalin, he hoped to inspire
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.”39
The White Paper aroused widespread fury.
Journalist
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union,
believed that the United States was
doing too much on behalf of a hopeless cause.
The China bloc was outraged because they
believed the United States was doing
too little. General Patrick
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
Republican Senators such as
Knowland, Styles Bridges,
and Kenneth Wherry,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran
assailed the White Paper as “a 1054 page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of aid.” Emphasizing
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.”
The Letter was essentially a political document
meant to portray
the Chinese communists as chumps
of Moscow; it stated that the CCP
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia,” though,
according to John Melby, who drafted
the White Paper, Acheson did not agree with
this assessment but approved the language
to appease the China bloc.38 But
by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue his
preferred policy of eventual
recognition, even if Mao were to
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. Even at this point,
Acheson was still searching for a way to keep
apart Moscow and Beijing. He apparently
believed that the CCP
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of its
own people and those of the Soviet Union.
By accusing Mao of submitting
to Stalin, he hoped to inspire
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.”39
The White Paper aroused widespread fury.
Journalist
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union,
believed that the United States was
doing too much on behalf of a hopeless cause.
The China bloc was outraged because they
believed the United States was doing
too little. General Patrick
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
Republican Senators such as
Knowland, Styles Bridges,
and Kenneth Wherry,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran
assailed the White Paper as “a 1054 page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
In the Letter, signed by the secretary of state,
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of American aid.”
Pointing out
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.” 29
The Letter was essentially a political document
that portrayed
the Chinese Communists as tools
of Moscow. It stated that the Chinese Communist
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia.” 30 This
was a position that Acheson did not hold,
according to John Melby, a key adviser on China
affairs for General Marshall, who had written
the draft of
the White Paper. 31 He approved this language
in order
to appease the China bloc and because he thought
it would be little noted. Once again, as he had in
1947 when he used the heightened rhetoric of the
“rotten apples” to gain support for aid to Greece
and Turkey, in the Letter Acheson dangerously
overstated his case.
By asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue a
policy of
recognition, even should Mao eventually
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. In fact,
Acheson was still searching for a way to
separate Beijing from Moscow. He seems to have
believed that China’s Communist leaders
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of their
own people and those of Moscow.
By accusing Mao of kowtowing
to Stalin, he hoped to spur on
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.” 32
Not only did
the White Paper arouse the ire of
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union and also
believed America had been
doing too much in a losing cause, it also
enraged
the China bloc, which believed America had
done
too little. General
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-Communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
33
Republican senators like
Knowland, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire,
and Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada,
assailed the White Paper as “a 1,054-page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of American aid.”
Pointing out
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.” 29
The Letter was essentially a political document
that portrayed
the Chinese Communists as tools
of Moscow. It stated that the Chinese Communist
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia.” 30 This
was a position that Acheson did not hold,
according to John Melby, a key adviser on China
affairs for General Marshall, who had written
the draft of
the White Paper. 31 He approved this language
in order
to appease the China bloc and because he thought
it would be little noted. Once again, as he had in
1947 when he used the heightened rhetoric of the
“rotten apples” to gain support for aid to Greece
and Turkey, in the Letter Acheson dangerously
overstated his case.
By asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue a
policy of
recognition, even should Mao eventually
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. In fact,
Acheson was still searching for a way to
separate Beijing from Moscow. He seems to have
believed that China’s Communist leaders
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of their
own people and those of Moscow.
By accusing Mao of kowtowing
to Stalin, he hoped to spur on
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.” 32
Not only did
the White Paper arouse the ire of
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union and also
believed America had been
doing too much in a losing cause, it also
enraged
the China bloc, which believed America had
done
too little. General
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-Communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
33
Republican senators like
Knowland, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire,
and Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada,
assailed the White Paper as “a 1,054-page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
Crowley, page 108
Chace, 1998
Walton Butterworth, the assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, argued for a UN
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence, and
George Kennan argued
for ridding the island of the Nationalists
but retaining it as a strategic asset
to the United States, Acheson
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
communists.46 But faced with domestic pressure
to support Taiwan from any threat by the
Chinese
communists, Acheson had to back down, at
least in theory.
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of
$75 million for “the general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon
discovered that the president,
on Acheson’s counsel,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president,
he
declared that the United States
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao's government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.
State for Far Eastern Affairs, argued for a UN
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence, and
George Kennan argued
for ridding the island of the Nationalists
but retaining it as a strategic asset
to the United States, Acheson
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
communists.46 But faced with domestic pressure
to support Taiwan from any threat by the
Chinese
communists, Acheson had to back down, at
least in theory.
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of
$75 million for “the general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon
discovered that the president,
on Acheson’s counsel,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president,
he
declared that the United States
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao's government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.
In the State Department Walton Butterworth, the
assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, and George Kennan offered different
approaches, designed to prevent the island from
coming under Mao’s control. Butterworth suggested
a United Nations
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence.
George Kennan proposed a drastic scheme
for ridding the island of the Nationalist
soldiers
but retaining it as strategically valuable
to the United States. He urged the use of
American forces to throw Chiang’s troops out of
Taiwan and the adjoining islands and, under
American auspices and protection, create an
independent country. This was the way “Theodore
Roosevelt might have done it,” he suggested, with
“resolution, speed, ruthlessness and
self-assurance.” 35 Acheson rejected these
proposals and
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
Communists. 36 In August 1949, in a meeting with
members of the National Security Council, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed that military
measures would be unwise. 37 Still, pressures
mounted on Acheson
to support Taiwan from any attack from the
mainland
Communists. As Acheson wrote to his old
friend Archibald MacLeish in early 1950,
“Formosa is a subject which seems to draw out the
boys like a red haired girl on the beach. It
appears that what you want most is what you ain’t
got.” 38
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of $
75 million for the “general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon
discovered that Truman,
on Acheson’s advice,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In a December 23
meeting between the State Department and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Acheson argued that “Mao is not a
true satellite in that he came to power by his own
efforts and was not installed in office by the
Soviet army.” In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president
he further
declared that America
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao’s government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.”
assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, and George Kennan offered different
approaches, designed to prevent the island from
coming under Mao’s control. Butterworth suggested
a United Nations
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence.
George Kennan proposed a drastic scheme
for ridding the island of the Nationalist
soldiers
but retaining it as strategically valuable
to the United States. He urged the use of
American forces to throw Chiang’s troops out of
Taiwan and the adjoining islands and, under
American auspices and protection, create an
independent country. This was the way “Theodore
Roosevelt might have done it,” he suggested, with
“resolution, speed, ruthlessness and
self-assurance.” 35 Acheson rejected these
proposals and
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
Communists. 36 In August 1949, in a meeting with
members of the National Security Council, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed that military
measures would be unwise. 37 Still, pressures
mounted on Acheson
to support Taiwan from any attack from the
mainland
Communists. As Acheson wrote to his old
friend Archibald MacLeish in early 1950,
“Formosa is a subject which seems to draw out the
boys like a red haired girl on the beach. It
appears that what you want most is what you ain’t
got.” 38
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of $
75 million for the “general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon
discovered that Truman,
on Acheson’s advice,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In a December 23
meeting between the State Department and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Acheson argued that “Mao is not a
true satellite in that he came to power by his own
efforts and was not installed in office by the
Soviet army.” In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president
he further
declared that America
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao’s government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.”
Crowley, page 114
Chace, 1998
On January 10, Acheson testified in executive
session before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He stated that
he saw no reason to move with dispatch on the
matter of recognizing Mao’s government, saying
that
he wanted to see how the CCP
would behave toward Americans in China and how
it would handle
the foreign debts incurred by
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”
Two days later, he delivered his famous speech
at
the National Press Club, during which he
reminded his audience that no one
said “the Nationalist government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist;” on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country had
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.” He
went on to
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defense
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippines.
Foreshadowing Nixon’s later policy of
Vietnamization, he stated that
in South Korea,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations...” He did emphasize,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea and Japan.
session before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He stated that
he saw no reason to move with dispatch on the
matter of recognizing Mao’s government, saying
that
he wanted to see how the CCP
would behave toward Americans in China and how
it would handle
the foreign debts incurred by
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”
Two days later, he delivered his famous speech
at
the National Press Club, during which he
reminded his audience that no one
said “the Nationalist government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist;” on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country had
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.” He
went on to
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defense
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippines.
Foreshadowing Nixon’s later policy of
Vietnamization, he stated that
in South Korea,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations...” He did emphasize,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea and Japan.
On January 10, 1950, Acheson testified in
executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. As far as recognition of
Mao’s government was concerned,
he saw no reason to move too swiftly at this
time.
He wanted to see how the Chinese Communists
would behave toward Americans in China, and
their attitude toward
the foreign debts of
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”44
Two days later Acheson delivered an important
address on Far Eastern policy to
the National Press Club in Washington. Tossing
aside the speech the department had prepared,
which he felt lacked life and had “no continuity
of thought,” he had made extensive notes for a new
speech at his house in Georgetown. Acheson’s press
club speech had little to do with military
matters, and indeed he had urged his listeners not
“to become obsessed with military considerations.”
In the main, Acheson was repeating for a larger
public what he had been saying privately to
members of Congress. He
reminded his audience that nobody
said “the Nationalist Government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist”; on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country has
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”45
Acheson did, however,
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defensive
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippine
Islands.
In South Korea, on the other hand,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations….” Acheson emphasized,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea, as it did for Japan.
executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. As far as recognition of
Mao’s government was concerned,
he saw no reason to move too swiftly at this
time.
He wanted to see how the Chinese Communists
would behave toward Americans in China, and
their attitude toward
the foreign debts of
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”44
Two days later Acheson delivered an important
address on Far Eastern policy to
the National Press Club in Washington. Tossing
aside the speech the department had prepared,
which he felt lacked life and had “no continuity
of thought,” he had made extensive notes for a new
speech at his house in Georgetown. Acheson’s press
club speech had little to do with military
matters, and indeed he had urged his listeners not
“to become obsessed with military considerations.”
In the main, Acheson was repeating for a larger
public what he had been saying privately to
members of Congress. He
reminded his audience that nobody
said “the Nationalist Government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist”; on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country has
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”45
Acheson did, however,
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defensive
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippine
Islands.
In South Korea, on the other hand,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations….” Acheson emphasized,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea, as it did for Japan.
Crowley, page 116
Chace, 1998
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later, Moscow and Beijing signed
a defense pact,
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later, Moscow and Beijing signed
a defense pact,
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact.
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact.
Crowley, page 114
Chace, 1998
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified
in executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. He reiterated his argument
for nonintervention and dismissed Taiwan as “not a
great question in American foreign policy,” but he
added that “it may become a very great question if
it obscures or changes or interferes with what we
are trying to do in regard to China.” And again,
he stated the belief that a split with Moscow was
possible:
“If the devil himself runs China,
if he is an independent devil, that is infinitely
better than if he is a stooge of Moscow.”
Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in
February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe,
will come into conflict with Moscow.”69 Further,
Acheson
told the senators that he was particularly wary
of Chiang’s
adventurism: the risk was
that Chiang, who was running a war against the
mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,”
would drag the United States into war with
mainland China.
According to Acheson, Chiang “believed that
World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which
case “the United States will have to go back and
conquer China, and he will come riding in on our
coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was tempting
Mao to invade Taiwan: “The •communists would be
criminally crazy
if they did not put an end to (Chiang’s hold ora
the island)
just as soon as possible.” Had this actually
happened, Acheson believed that he could have
overcome domestic
opposition to recognizing the communist
regime.
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact. Yet despite this rapprochement between
Russia and China, Acheson did not give up on the
hope of abandoning Chiang, recognizing the
People’s Republic of China, and then weaning it
away from a Soviet alliance.51
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified
in executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
“If the devil himself runs China,” he said,
“if he is an independent devil, that is
infinitely better than if he is a stooge of
Moscow, or China comes under Russia.”
Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in
February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe,
will come into conflict with Moscow.”52 Acheson
also
told the senators that he was especially wary
of Chiang Kai-shek’s
adventurism, the risk
that Chiang, who was running a war against the
mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,”
would drag the United States into conflict with
China proper.
According to Acheson, Chiang “believed
World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which
case “the United States will have to go back and
conquer China, and he will come riding in on our
coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was actually inviting
Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be
criminally crazy,” he advised the senators,
“if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s island
bastion]
just as soon as possible.”53 Had this
happened, Acheson believed that he could have
overcome
opposition to recognizing Communist China.
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact. Yet despite this rapprochement between
Russia and China, Acheson did not give up on the
hope of abandoning Chiang, recognizing the
People’s Republic of China, and then weaning it
away from a Soviet alliance.51
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified
in executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
“If the devil himself runs China,” he said,
“if he is an independent devil, that is
infinitely better than if he is a stooge of
Moscow, or China comes under Russia.”
Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in
February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe,
will come into conflict with Moscow.”52 Acheson
also
told the senators that he was especially wary
of Chiang Kai-shek’s
adventurism, the risk
that Chiang, who was running a war against the
mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,”
would drag the United States into conflict with
China proper.
According to Acheson, Chiang “believed
World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which
case “the United States will have to go back and
conquer China, and he will come riding in on our
coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was actually inviting
Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be
criminally crazy,” he advised the senators,
“if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s island
bastion]
just as soon as possible.”53 Had this
happened, Acheson believed that he could have
overcome
opposition to recognizing Communist China.
Crowley, page 136
America would continue its
dominant role in containing the Soviet Union,
but at a lower level of effort and with
a diminished prospect of armed intervention and
greater material assistance from allies.
dominant role in containing the Soviet Union,
but at a lower level of effort and with
a diminished prospect of armed intervention and
greater material assistance from allies.
The Nixon Doctrine envisions the maintenance of
America's
dominant role in containing the USSR,
but at a lower level of effort, of
a diminished prospect of armed intervention, and
with
greater material assistance from Allies.
America's
dominant role in containing the USSR,
but at a lower level of effort, of
a diminished prospect of armed intervention, and
with
greater material assistance from Allies.
Crowley, page 137
Andrianopoulos, 1988
The objective was to reduce America’s burden of
involvement without undermining its global
commitments and influence or the confidence of its
allies, which in turn depended on
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
involvement without undermining its global
commitments and influence or the confidence of its
allies, which in turn depended on
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
The Administration's ability to reduce
America's burden of involvement without
undermining its global commitments and influence
or the confidence of its Allies critically
depends upon
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
America's burden of involvement without
undermining its global commitments and influence
or the confidence of its Allies critically
depends upon
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
Crowley, page 304
A crucial part of the U.S.-China-Vietnam equation
was the understanding reached on Taiwan. In the
Shanghai Communique,
the United States made no specific public
concessions on when or if it would terminate
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
but it did “acknowledge” Beijing’s position that
there is “but one China” and that “Taiwan is part
of China.” Further, the United States
reaffirmed the promises it had initially
made in 1970 that, as “tensions in the area”
diminish, Washington would “progressively reduce
its forces and military installations in Taiwan.”
In addition,
the United States asserted
its interest in a “peaceful settlement” of the
Taiwan issue, but the communique did not
indicate
the specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had
offered
the Chinese in order to firm up
the new relationship. Nixon also assured the
Chinese
that he would “actively work toward” and complete
“full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by
1976,” the year that would end his second term in
office. He indicated that he would not
support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any kind of Taiwanese
independence movement, and he
agreed to “discourage Japan or any other third
country
from moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence
diminished.”
was the understanding reached on Taiwan. In the
Shanghai Communique,
the United States made no specific public
concessions on when or if it would terminate
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
but it did “acknowledge” Beijing’s position that
there is “but one China” and that “Taiwan is part
of China.” Further, the United States
reaffirmed the promises it had initially
made in 1970 that, as “tensions in the area”
diminish, Washington would “progressively reduce
its forces and military installations in Taiwan.”
In addition,
the United States asserted
its interest in a “peaceful settlement” of the
Taiwan issue, but the communique did not
indicate
the specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had
offered
the Chinese in order to firm up
the new relationship. Nixon also assured the
Chinese
that he would “actively work toward” and complete
“full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by
1976,” the year that would end his second term in
office. He indicated that he would not
support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any kind of Taiwanese
independence movement, and he
agreed to “discourage Japan or any other third
country
from moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence
diminished.”
The United States made no specific public
concessions on when or whether it would break
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
but it did "acknowledge" Beijing's position that
there is "but one China" and that "Taiwan is part
of China." In addition, Washington
reaffirmed the promises it had first
made in 1970 that, as "tensions in the area"
diminish, Washington would "progressively reduce
its forces and military installations in Taiwan."
The United States also stated
its interest in a "peaceful settlement" of the
Taiwan problem, but the Communiqué did not
mention
the specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had
proffered
the Chinese in order to cement
the new relationship. Most significant,
especially because of it implications for the
Ford administration, was Nixon's assurance
that he would "actively work toward" and complete
"full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by 1976,
the year that would end his second term in office.
Besides promising not to
support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any Taiwan
independence movement--apparently a source of
particular concern to Beijing--Nixon also
agreed to "discourage Japan or any other third
countries
from moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence
diminished.
Crowley, page 305
"The Kissinger Transcripts," 1998
The understanding reached between the U.S. and
the PRC
on Taiwan was connected
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. American
force reductions from the ROC
were dependent on the general reduction
of tensions in Asia. The implicit agreement
was that
China would
have to help to reduce
those tensions by getting the North Vietnamese
to work with Washington to end the war. During
the months after Nixon’s 1972
visit, Kissinger continually briefed Chinese
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and asked
them explicitly
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese expressed
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissinger
described
the remarks as
“moderate,” far less hostile than they could
have been. Even
when the peace talks collapsed after
Kissinger’s famous “peace is at hand” remark,
and
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from a continuation of
the war, they listened
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks
to the North Vietnamese. And even though Beijing
condemned
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
moderating role until the
peace agreement was signed.
the PRC
on Taiwan was connected
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. American
force reductions from the ROC
were dependent on the general reduction
of tensions in Asia. The implicit agreement
was that
China would
have to help to reduce
those tensions by getting the North Vietnamese
to work with Washington to end the war. During
the months after Nixon’s 1972
visit, Kissinger continually briefed Chinese
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and asked
them explicitly
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese expressed
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissinger
described
the remarks as
“moderate,” far less hostile than they could
have been. Even
when the peace talks collapsed after
Kissinger’s famous “peace is at hand” remark,
and
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from a continuation of
the war, they listened
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks
to the North Vietnamese. And even though Beijing
condemned
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
moderating role until the
peace agreement was signed.
The understanding
on Taiwan was linked
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. U.S.
force reductions from Taiwan
were dependent on the lessening
of tensions in the area. Implicitly,
China would also
have to help lessen
those tensions by encouraging North Vietnam
to settle at the conference table. While China's
(or for that matter the Soviet Union's) impact
on the negotiations remains to be learned, in
the months after Nixon's
visit, Kissinger was assiduous in briefing PRC
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and in asking
them
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese would
express
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissinger found
the remarks
"moderate."
When the peace talks broke down in the wake of
Kissinger's famous "peace is at hand" statement,
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from extended conflict.
Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua admonished that
"one should not lose the whole world just to
gain South Vietnam." Nevertheless, the Chinese
kept listening
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing
attacks. While Beijing would strongly condemn
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
role as intermediary until the signing of the
Paris
peace agreement.
on Taiwan was linked
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. U.S.
force reductions from Taiwan
were dependent on the lessening
of tensions in the area. Implicitly,
China would also
have to help lessen
those tensions by encouraging North Vietnam
to settle at the conference table. While China's
(or for that matter the Soviet Union's) impact
on the negotiations remains to be learned, in
the months after Nixon's
visit, Kissinger was assiduous in briefing PRC
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and in asking
them
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese would
express
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissinger found
the remarks
"moderate."
When the peace talks broke down in the wake of
Kissinger's famous "peace is at hand" statement,
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from extended conflict.
Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua admonished that
"one should not lose the whole world just to
gain South Vietnam." Nevertheless, the Chinese
kept listening
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing
attacks. While Beijing would strongly condemn
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
role as intermediary until the signing of the
Paris
peace agreement.
Crowley, page 23
The policy coordination that is generated from
reaching this level
implies that the policies of each state have been
adjusted to reduce, if not necessarily minimize,
their negative consequences for the other states.
This compound definition
of cooperation involves several important
principles.
First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is
directed toward some goal or goals, which
need not be the same for all of
the actors involved, but that the behavior is
rational and grounded in some degree of
self-interest. Second, it
implies that cooperation provides the actors with
gains that they concluded could not be achieved
through individualistic action. The distribution
of
gains need not be the same across the board,
but the gains
are mutual. Again, self-interest is the motive:
each actor helps the others to realize their
goals by adjusting its policies in order to
achieve its own goal. This dissertation will
also attempt to distinguish between cooperation
and the pursuit of unilateral advantage.
Cooperation is usually considered the antithesis
of
competition or conflict, which consists of
individualistic
goal-seeking activity that seeks
to reduce the gains available to others.
Unilateral behavior and
inactivity may also
be considered uncooperative if they do not reduce
the negative ramifications
for others of these policies. Although
cooperation is usually opposed to competition or
conflict, it can also take place in a competitive
context; indeed, cooperation often arises to
prevent existing competition or conflict from
spinning beyond the actors’ control. Thus
cooperation depends on self-interested
goal-directed behavior that includes mutual policy
adjustments so that ail participating sides
believe they will end up better off than if they
had not cooperated; whether or not cooperation
actually produces this result is a separate issue.
reaching this level
implies that the policies of each state have been
adjusted to reduce, if not necessarily minimize,
their negative consequences for the other states.
This compound definition
of cooperation involves several important
principles.
First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is
directed toward some goal or goals, which
need not be the same for all of
the actors involved, but that the behavior is
rational and grounded in some degree of
self-interest. Second, it
implies that cooperation provides the actors with
gains that they concluded could not be achieved
through individualistic action. The distribution
of
gains need not be the same across the board,
but the gains
are mutual. Again, self-interest is the motive:
each actor helps the others to realize their
goals by adjusting its policies in order to
achieve its own goal. This dissertation will
also attempt to distinguish between cooperation
and the pursuit of unilateral advantage.
Cooperation is usually considered the antithesis
of
competition or conflict, which consists of
individualistic
goal-seeking activity that seeks
to reduce the gains available to others.
Unilateral behavior and
inactivity may also
be considered uncooperative if they do not reduce
the negative ramifications
for others of these policies. Although
cooperation is usually opposed to competition or
conflict, it can also take place in a competitive
context; indeed, cooperation often arises to
prevent existing competition or conflict from
spinning beyond the actors’ control. Thus
cooperation depends on self-interested
goal-directed behavior that includes mutual policy
adjustments so that ail participating sides
believe they will end up better off than if they
had not cooperated; whether or not cooperation
actually produces this result is a separate issue.
Policy coordination, in turn,
implies that the policies of each state have been
adjusted to reduce
their negative consequences for the other states.
This conception
of cooperation consists of two important
elements.
First, it assumes that each actor's behavior is
directed toward some goal(s). It
need not be the same goal for all
the actors involved, but it does assume
rational behavior on their part. Second, the
definition
implies that cooperation provides the actors with
gains or rewards. The
gains need not be the same in magnitude or kind
for each state, but they
are mutual.
Each actor helps the others to realize their
goals by adjusting its policies in the
anticipation of its own reward. Each actor is
not necessarily out to help the other, though;
it is the anticipation of bettering one's own
situation that leads to the adjustment in one's
policies. Defining what is not cooperation is also
important.
Cooperation is usually opposed to
competition or conflict, which implies
goal-seeking behavior that strives
to reduce the gains available to others or to
impede their want-satisfaction. But there are
other alternatives to cooperation as well.
Unilateral behavior, in which actors do not take
account of the effects of their actions on others,
and also
inactivity are alternatives to cooperation.
Although such behaviors may not attempt to lower
the gains of others, they can
be considered uncooperative if they do not reduce
the negative consequences
for others of each party's policies.
implies that the policies of each state have been
adjusted to reduce
their negative consequences for the other states.
This conception
of cooperation consists of two important
elements.
First, it assumes that each actor's behavior is
directed toward some goal(s). It
need not be the same goal for all
the actors involved, but it does assume
rational behavior on their part. Second, the
definition
implies that cooperation provides the actors with
gains or rewards. The
gains need not be the same in magnitude or kind
for each state, but they
are mutual.
Each actor helps the others to realize their
goals by adjusting its policies in the
anticipation of its own reward. Each actor is
not necessarily out to help the other, though;
it is the anticipation of bettering one's own
situation that leads to the adjustment in one's
policies. Defining what is not cooperation is also
important.
Cooperation is usually opposed to
competition or conflict, which implies
goal-seeking behavior that strives
to reduce the gains available to others or to
impede their want-satisfaction. But there are
other alternatives to cooperation as well.
Unilateral behavior, in which actors do not take
account of the effects of their actions on others,
and also
inactivity are alternatives to cooperation.
Although such behaviors may not attempt to lower
the gains of others, they can
be considered uncooperative if they do not reduce
the negative consequences
for others of each party's policies.
Crowley, page 26
Milner, 1992
The cooperation under anarchy literature stresses
that fewer players are more conducive to
cooperation; indeed the argument implicitly
suggests
that two is the ideal number of players, an
argument
explicitly made by Waltz in his defense of
bipolarity. But
is it necessarily the case
that the fewer the players
the better the prospects for cooperation? This
is an important question that Milner raises and
one that requires empirical examination.
Challenging the “fewer is better’ claim are
several arguments. First, if the goal is to
achieve
a balanced agreement (in which worrying about
cheating is already a given),
a larger number of players may actually
be better, since it offers greater
opportunities for exchanges and side payments.
Grieco argues that “the state will prefer more
partners, for larger numbers would enhance the
likelihood that relative gains
advantaging....better-positioned
partners could be offset by more favorable
sharings arising from interactions with weaker
partners.”
that fewer players are more conducive to
cooperation; indeed the argument implicitly
suggests
that two is the ideal number of players, an
argument
explicitly made by Waltz in his defense of
bipolarity. But
is it necessarily the case
that the fewer the players
the better the prospects for cooperation? This
is an important question that Milner raises and
one that requires empirical examination.
Challenging the “fewer is better’ claim are
several arguments. First, if the goal is to
achieve
a balanced agreement (in which worrying about
cheating is already a given),
a larger number of players may actually
be better, since it offers greater
opportunities for exchanges and side payments.
Grieco argues that “the state will prefer more
partners, for larger numbers would enhance the
likelihood that relative gains
advantaging....better-positioned
partners could be offset by more favorable
sharings arising from interactions with weaker
partners.”
They create serious collective action problems
for states. This argument seems to suggest
that two is the ideal number of players, though
the point is never
explicitly stated. Indeed, the extensive use of
two-person games reinforces this impression.
Is it necessarily the case, though,
that the fewer the actors
the better the prospects for cooperation?
Several strands of argument challenge this
claim. First, if one is concerned about more
than just cheating, such as whether
a balanced agreement can be struck,
a larger number of players may
be better, since it provides more
opportunities for exchanges and side-payments.
Grieco argues that "the state will prefer more
partners, for larger numbers would enhance the
likelihood that relative gains advantaging . . .
better-positioned
partners could be offset by more favorable
sharings arising from interactions with weaker
partners." (p. 228)
for states. This argument seems to suggest
that two is the ideal number of players, though
the point is never
explicitly stated. Indeed, the extensive use of
two-person games reinforces this impression.
Is it necessarily the case, though,
that the fewer the actors
the better the prospects for cooperation?
Several strands of argument challenge this
claim. First, if one is concerned about more
than just cheating, such as whether
a balanced agreement can be struck,
a larger number of players may
be better, since it provides more
opportunities for exchanges and side-payments.
Grieco argues that "the state will prefer more
partners, for larger numbers would enhance the
likelihood that relative gains advantaging . . .
better-positioned
partners could be offset by more favorable
sharings arising from interactions with weaker
partners." (p. 228)
Crowley, page 27-28
Milner, 1992
As Milner states, “with three actors, in the
system, cooperation between two may be
more efficacious than going it alone. Indeed,
balance of power theories based on anarchy predict
this: states will cooperate to counterbalance
others whose relative power is growing.” Grieco’s
two-player model indicates that
cooperation is difficult; Snidal demonstrates,
however, that adding
more players increases the likelihood that
players
will cooperate to increase their own
security.
system, cooperation between two may be
more efficacious than going it alone. Indeed,
balance of power theories based on anarchy predict
this: states will cooperate to counterbalance
others whose relative power is growing.” Grieco’s
two-player model indicates that
cooperation is difficult; Snidal demonstrates,
however, that adding
more players increases the likelihood that
players
will cooperate to increase their own
security.
With three actors in the system, cooperation
between two may be far
more efficacious than going it alone. Indeed,
balance of power theories based on anarchy predict
this: states will cooperate to counterbalance
others whose relative power is growing. In
Grieco's two-person model
cooperation is difficult; as Snidal shows,
however, the addition of
more players increases the likelihood that
groups
will cooperate to enhance their security.
between two may be far
more efficacious than going it alone. Indeed,
balance of power theories based on anarchy predict
this: states will cooperate to counterbalance
others whose relative power is growing. In
Grieco's two-person model
cooperation is difficult; as Snidal shows,
however, the addition of
more players increases the likelihood that
groups
will cooperate to enhance their security.
Crowley, page 28
Milner, 1992
This is not done for unselfish reasons. Indeed,
failure to cooperate may have dangerous results.
If a state decides not to cooperate
with others, they may collaborate and gain
relative advantages over it. If it is true
that in some cases adding players increases
the likelihood of cooperation, then it may
follow that
adding issues will do the same.
On any single issue, two or more
states may be divided;
on several issues, embedded in the broader
relationship,
they are likely to have different preference
hierarchies and thus
be able to deal
across issues. This is the logic of linkage.
failure to cooperate may have dangerous results.
If a state decides not to cooperate
with others, they may collaborate and gain
relative advantages over it. If it is true
that in some cases adding players increases
the likelihood of cooperation, then it may
follow that
adding issues will do the same.
On any single issue, two or more
states may be divided;
on several issues, embedded in the broader
relationship,
they are likely to have different preference
hierarchies and thus
be able to deal
across issues. This is the logic of linkage.
Indeed, the relative gains of your allies in
this situation may enhance your own security.
Furthermore,
failure to cooperate may have devastating
consequences. If you refuse to work
with others, they may work together and gain
even greater
relative advantages over you than they might
otherwise...Moreover, even if relative gains are
central, does that necessarily impede
cooperation? As noted above, adding more
players raises
the likelihood of cooperation.
Adding issues should also increase cooperation.
Thus,
on any single issue, two
states may be directly opposed; but
on several,
they are likely to have different preference
rankings and
be able to make exchanges
across issues.
this situation may enhance your own security.
Furthermore,
failure to cooperate may have devastating
consequences. If you refuse to work
with others, they may work together and gain
even greater
relative advantages over you than they might
otherwise...Moreover, even if relative gains are
central, does that necessarily impede
cooperation? As noted above, adding more
players raises
the likelihood of cooperation.
Adding issues should also increase cooperation.
Thus,
on any single issue, two
states may be directly opposed; but
on several,
they are likely to have different preference
rankings and
be able to make exchanges
across issues.
Crowley, page 327-328
In fact, the case for expanded military
assistance was made
with unprecedented urgency by Secretary of
Defense Melvin
Laird in preparation for the
vastly increased Military Assistance Program
for 1972 and the large arms transfers of the
succeeding fiscal years. Laird
characterized MAP as “the essential ingredient of
our policy if we are to honor our obligations,
support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood
of having to commit American ground combat units.”
Laird, however, recognized
the declining
popular and congressional support for military
assistance. His solution, considered annually in
the Defense Department
but proposed for the first time in a secretarial
posture statement to the Congress, was
that “military assistance should be integrated
into the defense budget so that we can plan more
rationally and present to the Congress more fully
an integrated program.” Military aid for certain
“forward defense countries,” including South
Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos, and consisting of
about 80 percent of the total category “Support
for Other Nations,”106 was, in 1971, already
included in the U.S.
defense budget, though
this legislative ploy had
not yet been applied to Taiwan or Korea.
To merge military assistance further
into the regular functional appropriation
categories of the defense budget was
to institutionalize a
rationale for military assistance that had
become a
traditional point of
debate within the Department of Defense. As
Laird stated,
“A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a
dollar spent directly on U.S. forces.”
assistance was made
with unprecedented urgency by Secretary of
Defense Melvin
Laird in preparation for the
vastly increased Military Assistance Program
for 1972 and the large arms transfers of the
succeeding fiscal years. Laird
characterized MAP as “the essential ingredient of
our policy if we are to honor our obligations,
support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood
of having to commit American ground combat units.”
Laird, however, recognized
the declining
popular and congressional support for military
assistance. His solution, considered annually in
the Defense Department
but proposed for the first time in a secretarial
posture statement to the Congress, was
that “military assistance should be integrated
into the defense budget so that we can plan more
rationally and present to the Congress more fully
an integrated program.” Military aid for certain
“forward defense countries,” including South
Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos, and consisting of
about 80 percent of the total category “Support
for Other Nations,”106 was, in 1971, already
included in the U.S.
defense budget, though
this legislative ploy had
not yet been applied to Taiwan or Korea.
To merge military assistance further
into the regular functional appropriation
categories of the defense budget was
to institutionalize a
rationale for military assistance that had
become a
traditional point of
debate within the Department of Defense. As
Laird stated,
“A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a
dollar spent directly on U.S. forces.”
The case for expanded military assistance has
been stated
with unprecedented urgency by Secretary
Laird in preparation for
vastly increased Military Assistance Program
(MAP) budget requests
for 1972 and
succeeding fiscal years. Secretary Laird has
characterized MAP as "the essential ingredient of
our policy if we are to honor our obligations,
support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood
of having to commit American ground combat
units."[ii] But the Secretary recognizes
the declining level of
popular and Congressional support for military
assistance. His solution, considered perennially
within
the Defense and State Departments
but proposed for the first time in a Secretarial
posture statement to the Congress, is
that "military assistance should be integrated
into the Defense Budget so that we can plan more
rationally and present to the Congress more fully
an integrated program." Military aid for certain
"forward defense countries," including South
Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, and consisting of
about 80 percent of the total category "Support
for Other Nations,"[iii] is already meshed into
the
Defense Budget.
This legislative ploy has
not yet been applied to Korea or Taiwan,
though the reduction of our troops in Korea and
the insurance of Taiwan against communist pressure
depend, in the judgment of this Administration, on
the freedom to substitute U.S. matériel for
manpower.
To merge military assistance entirely
into the regular functional appropriation
categories of the Defense Budget would be
to institutionalize the dual
rationale for military assistance that has
become
traditional in
debate within the Department of Defense. The
first element in this rationale is the argument
from "trade-off"-a calculus that compares the
costs of equal units of effectiveness of U. S. and
foreign troops. This is essentially an assertion
of "absolute advantage" and is the basic and
obvious sense of Secretary Laird's statement:
"A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a
dollar spent directly on U.S. forces,"
been stated
with unprecedented urgency by Secretary
Laird in preparation for
vastly increased Military Assistance Program
(MAP) budget requests
for 1972 and
succeeding fiscal years. Secretary Laird has
characterized MAP as "the essential ingredient of
our policy if we are to honor our obligations,
support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood
of having to commit American ground combat
units."[ii] But the Secretary recognizes
the declining level of
popular and Congressional support for military
assistance. His solution, considered perennially
within
the Defense and State Departments
but proposed for the first time in a Secretarial
posture statement to the Congress, is
that "military assistance should be integrated
into the Defense Budget so that we can plan more
rationally and present to the Congress more fully
an integrated program." Military aid for certain
"forward defense countries," including South
Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, and consisting of
about 80 percent of the total category "Support
for Other Nations,"[iii] is already meshed into
the
Defense Budget.
This legislative ploy has
not yet been applied to Korea or Taiwan,
though the reduction of our troops in Korea and
the insurance of Taiwan against communist pressure
depend, in the judgment of this Administration, on
the freedom to substitute U.S. matériel for
manpower.
To merge military assistance entirely
into the regular functional appropriation
categories of the Defense Budget would be
to institutionalize the dual
rationale for military assistance that has
become
traditional in
debate within the Department of Defense. The
first element in this rationale is the argument
from "trade-off"-a calculus that compares the
costs of equal units of effectiveness of U. S. and
foreign troops. This is essentially an assertion
of "absolute advantage" and is the basic and
obvious sense of Secretary Laird's statement:
"A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a
dollar spent directly on U.S. forces,"
Crowley, page 301
Henry Kissinger, "The White House Years," 1979
The administration interpreted Chou’s remarks to mean that North Vietnam was not an extension of Chinese policy and that Chou treated Vietnam largely in the context of long-term Soviet aspirations in the region. His principal interest in seeing the war end quickly was that it weighed down the United States and deflected American interests from more important parts of the world, namely China.
We interpreted this to mean that China would not intervene militarily in Vietnam; that North Vietnam was not an extension of Chinese policy; and that Chou treated Vietnam largely in the context of long‐term Soviet aspirations in southeast Asia. His principal argument for ending the war quickly was that it bogged down the United States and deflected our energies from more important parts of the globe.
Crowley, page 300-301
Kissinger, 1979
Chou averred rhetorical and marginal material
support for Hanoi, but he
based it not on national interest or ideological
connection
but on an historical debt incurred by the Chinese
empire
centuries before. The Chinese were not,
however, prepared to risk war for this debt.
The war in Vietnam would not, Chou implied,
affect the improvement o f Sino-American
relations; shortly thereafter, the Soviets
implied the same. “Moscow and Peking, for all
their hatred of each other, and perhaps
because of it, were agreed on this point: North
Vietnam would not be permitted to override their
greater geopolitical preoccupations. Against all
odds,” proclaimed Kissinger, “our diplomacy was
on the verge of isolating Hanoi.
support for Hanoi, but he
based it not on national interest or ideological
connection
but on an historical debt incurred by the Chinese
empire
centuries before. The Chinese were not,
however, prepared to risk war for this debt.
The war in Vietnam would not, Chou implied,
affect the improvement o f Sino-American
relations; shortly thereafter, the Soviets
implied the same. “Moscow and Peking, for all
their hatred of each other, and perhaps
because of it, were agreed on this point: North
Vietnam would not be permitted to override their
greater geopolitical preoccupations. Against all
odds,” proclaimed Kissinger, “our diplomacy was
on the verge of isolating Hanoi.
He averred support for Hanoi but he again
based it not on national interest or ideological
solidarity
but on an historical debt incurred by the Chinese
empire several
centuries before. Clearly China might make some
material sacrifices; it would not run the risk
of war to discharge such a debt. China, insisted
the subtle Premier, had refrained from avowing any
special link to Vietnam in the communiquébecause
it did not want to leave the wrong impression.
Chou told Nixon:We have extreme sympathy for the
people of that area. We believe they are closely
linked with us. We thought of using wording in the
communiqué but then we thought maybe there would
be other implications and so we did not do so...
As Chairman Mao has pointed out, we who have been
victorious have only an obligation to assist them,
but not the right to interfere in their
sovereignty. The debt we owe them was incurred
by our ancestors. We have since liberation no
responsibility because we overthrew the old
system... Dr. Kissinger can bear witness that we
have exerted extreme restraint since July of last
year. Yet the key to easing tensions in the world
does not lie there and Mr. President and I and
Chairman Mao all understand that. We indeed
understood each other;
the war in Vietnam would not
affect the improvement of our
relations. The avowal of restraint and of
the fact that the key to easing tensions did not
lie in Indochina left no doubt that Peking’s
priority was not the war on its Southern
border but its relationship with us. Three months
later Moscow revealed the same priorities, more
crudely.
based it not on national interest or ideological
solidarity
but on an historical debt incurred by the Chinese
empire several
centuries before. Clearly China might make some
material sacrifices; it would not run the risk
of war to discharge such a debt. China, insisted
the subtle Premier, had refrained from avowing any
special link to Vietnam in the communiquébecause
it did not want to leave the wrong impression.
Chou told Nixon:We have extreme sympathy for the
people of that area. We believe they are closely
linked with us. We thought of using wording in the
communiqué but then we thought maybe there would
be other implications and so we did not do so...
As Chairman Mao has pointed out, we who have been
victorious have only an obligation to assist them,
but not the right to interfere in their
sovereignty. The debt we owe them was incurred
by our ancestors. We have since liberation no
responsibility because we overthrew the old
system... Dr. Kissinger can bear witness that we
have exerted extreme restraint since July of last
year. Yet the key to easing tensions in the world
does not lie there and Mr. President and I and
Chairman Mao all understand that. We indeed
understood each other;
the war in Vietnam would not
affect the improvement of our
relations. The avowal of restraint and of
the fact that the key to easing tensions did not
lie in Indochina left no doubt that Peking’s
priority was not the war on its Southern
border but its relationship with us. Three months
later Moscow revealed the same priorities, more
crudely.
Crowley, page 256
Kissinger, 1979
Kissinger reported that one view
argued that the Soviets were so suspicious of
U.S.-Chinese cooperation
that any effort to improve relations with China
would make Soviet-American detente
impossible.
argued that the Soviets were so suspicious of
U.S.-Chinese cooperation
that any effort to improve relations with China
would make Soviet-American detente
impossible.
One view (which we might call the “Slavophile”
position)
argued that the Soviets were so suspicious of
US‐ Chinese collusion
that any effort to improve relations with China
would make Soviet‐American cooperation
impossible.
position)
argued that the Soviets were so suspicious of
US‐ Chinese collusion
that any effort to improve relations with China
would make Soviet‐American cooperation
impossible.
Crowley, page 404
The detente of the 1970’s did not succeed, in the
view of many
Americans, because of Soviet actions that
contravened what the United States
understood detente to mean. Either the
Soviets undermined
detente, or if they did act in ways consistent
with it, detente as a policy
was flawed. From the American perspective, then,
both Moscow
and detente itself shared
the blame for the decline of the policy. The
view from Moscow, was, of course, very different.
From the Soviet perspective,
the joint detente effort was abandoned
deliberately
by the United States as it sought
to seek advantages from a policy of
confrontation, renew a
quest for military superiority, and were
unwilling to accept strategic parity.
view of many
Americans, because of Soviet actions that
contravened what the United States
understood detente to mean. Either the
Soviets undermined
detente, or if they did act in ways consistent
with it, detente as a policy
was flawed. From the American perspective, then,
both Moscow
and detente itself shared
the blame for the decline of the policy. The
view from Moscow, was, of course, very different.
From the Soviet perspective,
the joint detente effort was abandoned
deliberately
by the United States as it sought
to seek advantages from a policy of
confrontation, renew a
quest for military superiority, and were
unwilling to accept strategic parity.
The detente of the 1970s did not succeed, in the
view of most
Americans, because of Soviet actions which
contravened what we
understood detente to mean—either the Soviet
leaders abused
detente, or if they did act in accordance
with it, detente itself
was flawed. Both the Soviet Union
and "detente" itself were thus seen as sharing
the blame for a mounting series of disquieting
developments. In the Soviet view,
the joint detente effort of the 1970s (the drive
for which they attribute to themselves) has been
willfully abandoned
by the United States. The leaders of the United
States since the late 1970s are seen as having
preferred
to seek advantages from a policy of
confrontation, as having launched a renewed
American
quest for military superiority, and as
unwilling to accept strategic and political
parity.
view of most
Americans, because of Soviet actions which
contravened what we
understood detente to mean—either the Soviet
leaders abused
detente, or if they did act in accordance
with it, detente itself
was flawed. Both the Soviet Union
and "detente" itself were thus seen as sharing
the blame for a mounting series of disquieting
developments. In the Soviet view,
the joint detente effort of the 1970s (the drive
for which they attribute to themselves) has been
willfully abandoned
by the United States. The leaders of the United
States since the late 1970s are seen as having
preferred
to seek advantages from a policy of
confrontation, as having launched a renewed
American
quest for military superiority, and as
unwilling to accept strategic and political
parity.
Crowley, page 405
Garthoff, 1982
This difference in
perspective made
it difficult for Americans and Soviets to even
conduct retrospective
assessments of the
detente effort of of the I970’s
in order to determine
the causes of its failure. In fact,
such assessments were not even considered
necessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each
side, the actions of the other were blamed
for the breakdown of detente. But it may have
been that neither side hoped that strongly that
detente would succeed From 1969 to 1979, the
rival superpowers sought—with varying degrees of
success—
to increase the range of cooperation and
negotiation of differences while regulating
competition and reducing the likelihood and the
intensity
of confrontation. Of the many reasons for its
failure, perhaps the most profound is that it was
designed on the American side to be unsustainable.
perspective made
it difficult for Americans and Soviets to even
conduct retrospective
assessments of the
detente effort of of the I970’s
in order to determine
the causes of its failure. In fact,
such assessments were not even considered
necessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each
side, the actions of the other were blamed
for the breakdown of detente. But it may have
been that neither side hoped that strongly that
detente would succeed From 1969 to 1979, the
rival superpowers sought—with varying degrees of
success—
to increase the range of cooperation and
negotiation of differences while regulating
competition and reducing the likelihood and the
intensity
of confrontation. Of the many reasons for its
failure, perhaps the most profound is that it was
designed on the American side to be unsustainable.
This difference in perspective—like so many
differences in American and Soviet
perspective and perception—even makes
it difficult to conduct parallel American and
Soviet
assessments of the common
detente effort of the 1970s
in order to diagnose
the causes of its failure. Indeed,
such assessments are scarcely deemed
necessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each
side, the actions of the other are virtually
taken for granted as having been responsible
for the breakdown of detente...What we are
dealing with is the concrete historical experience
of a common American-Soviet effort from 1969
through 1975, and more tenuously through 1979,
to increase the range of cooperation and
negotiation of differences, while regulating
competition and reducing instances and
intensities
of confrontation.
differences in American and Soviet
perspective and perception—even makes
it difficult to conduct parallel American and
Soviet
assessments of the common
detente effort of the 1970s
in order to diagnose
the causes of its failure. Indeed,
such assessments are scarcely deemed
necessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each
side, the actions of the other are virtually
taken for granted as having been responsible
for the breakdown of detente...What we are
dealing with is the concrete historical experience
of a common American-Soviet effort from 1969
through 1975, and more tenuously through 1979,
to increase the range of cooperation and
negotiation of differences, while regulating
competition and reducing instances and
intensities
of confrontation.
Crowley, page 409-10
Garthoff, 1982
Further, when Nixon returned from the 1972 summit, he not only urged ratification of the SALT agreement but an increase in strategic arms, leading Secretary of Defense Laird to make his support for the treaty contingent on congressional support for new military programs. Negotiation, as he, Nixon, and Kissinger repeatedly made clear, was to be done from a “position of strength,” cold war language that the language of detente had not fully replaced.
Also, upon the President's return to Washington from the summit he urged not only ratification of the SALT I agreements but also an increase in strategic arms. Defense Secretary Laird even conditioned his support for SALT on congressional approval of new military programs, which he justified as necessary so as to be able to negotiate "from a position of strength", wittingly or not invoking a key "cold war" symbol.
Crowley, page 141-143
John Lewis Gaddis, "Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War," 1982
The difficulty here, however, is that we have
very limited experience with tripolar systems;
indeed,
our actual experience is limited to the
functioning
of a single system—the balance of
power—operating
within the multipolar (generally five powers)
framework
that characterized world
politics until World War II, or the bipolar
arrangement
that has characterized them since. Alternative
systems, such as tripolarity, remain derived
primarily from multipolar and bipolar theories.
The nature of international politics
since 1945 can be viewed in terms of “systems
theory.” Jervis has argued that
an “international system” exists when
interconnections exist between units in
the system, so that changes in some parts of it
produce changes in other parts as well, and that
the collective behavior of the system as a whole
differs from the expectations and priorities of
the individual units that make it up.5 Since
World War II, the
major powers assumed
that little could
happen in the world without either
enhancing or damaging their own interests: as
Jervis notes, “almost by definition a great power
is more tightly connected to larger numbers of
other states than is a small power.”6 Further,
the collective behavior of states has not
corresponded to their individual expectations,
particularly when many of the
statesmen who pieced together the post-war
arrangements expected another war to erupt
relatively soon thereafter.7
Systems theory
provides criteria for differentiating between
stable and unstable political frameworks that may
help to explain why
some international systems last longer than
others.
Deutsch and Singer
defined “stability” as “the probability that the
system retains all of its essential
characteristics; that no single nation becomes
dominant; that most of its members continue to
survive; and that large-scale war does not occur.”
This system has a
capacity for self-regulation; that is, to
counterbalance threatening situations before they
spin
out of control. Craig and George established
that
self-regulating mechanisms are most likely to
operate
when there is some basic
agreement among the
major states of
the system on the objectives of
it, when the structure of the system accurately
reflects power distribution in the system, and
when pre-established
procedures exist for resolving differences.
very limited experience with tripolar systems;
indeed,
our actual experience is limited to the
functioning
of a single system—the balance of
power—operating
within the multipolar (generally five powers)
framework
that characterized world
politics until World War II, or the bipolar
arrangement
that has characterized them since. Alternative
systems, such as tripolarity, remain derived
primarily from multipolar and bipolar theories.
The nature of international politics
since 1945 can be viewed in terms of “systems
theory.” Jervis has argued that
an “international system” exists when
interconnections exist between units in
the system, so that changes in some parts of it
produce changes in other parts as well, and that
the collective behavior of the system as a whole
differs from the expectations and priorities of
the individual units that make it up.5 Since
World War II, the
major powers assumed
that little could
happen in the world without either
enhancing or damaging their own interests: as
Jervis notes, “almost by definition a great power
is more tightly connected to larger numbers of
other states than is a small power.”6 Further,
the collective behavior of states has not
corresponded to their individual expectations,
particularly when many of the
statesmen who pieced together the post-war
arrangements expected another war to erupt
relatively soon thereafter.7
Systems theory
provides criteria for differentiating between
stable and unstable political frameworks that may
help to explain why
some international systems last longer than
others.
Deutsch and Singer
defined “stability” as “the probability that the
system retains all of its essential
characteristics; that no single nation becomes
dominant; that most of its members continue to
survive; and that large-scale war does not occur.”
This system has a
capacity for self-regulation; that is, to
counterbalance threatening situations before they
spin
out of control. Craig and George established
that
self-regulating mechanisms are most likely to
operate
when there is some basic
agreement among the
major states of
the system on the objectives of
it, when the structure of the system accurately
reflects power distribution in the system, and
when pre-established
procedures exist for resolving differences.
The difficulty here is that
our actual experience is limited to the
operations
of a single system-the balance of power
system-operating either
within the "multipolar" configuration
that characterized international
politics until World War II, or the "bipolar"
configuration
that has characterized them since. Alternative
systems remain abstract conceptualizations in
the minds of theorists, and are of little use in
advancing our knowledge of how wars in the real
world do or do not occur.3 But "systems theory"
itself is something else again: here one can find
a useful point of departure for thinking about
the nature of international relations
since 1945.
An "international system" exists, political
scientists tell us, when two conditions are met:
first,
interconnections exist between units within
the system, so that changes in some parts of it
produce changes in other parts as well; and,
second,
the collective behavior of the system as a whole
differs from the expectations and priorities of
the individual units that make it Up.4 Certainly
demonstrating the "interconnectedness" of
post-World War II international relations is not
difficult: one of its most prominent
characteristics has been the tendency of
major powers to assume
that little if anything can
happen in the world without in some way
enhancing or detracting from their own
immediate interests.5 Nor has
the collective behavior of nations
corresponded to their individual expectations:
the very fact that the interim arrangements of
1945 have remained largely intact for four decades
would have astonished-and quite possibly
appalled-the
statesmen who cobbled them together in the
hectic months that followed the surrender of
Germany and Japan.6 A particularly valuable
feature of
systems theory is that it
provides criteria for differentiating between
stable and unstable political configurations:
these can help to account for the fact that
some international systems outlast others.
Karl
Deutsch and J. David Singer have
defined "stability" as "the probability that the
system retains all of its essential
characteristics: that no single nation becomes
dominant; that most of its members continue to
survive; and that large-scale war does not occur."
It is characteristic of such a system, Deutsch
and Singer add, that it has the
capacity for self-regulation: the ability to
counteract stimuli that would otherwise threaten
its survival, much as the automatic pilot on an
airplane or the governor on a steam engine would
do. "Self-regulating" systems are very different
from what they call "self-aggravating" systems,
situations that get
out of control, like forest fires, drug
addiction, runaway inflation, nuclear fission,
and of course, although they themselves do not
cite the example, all-out war.7
Self-regulating mechanisms are most likely to
function, in turn,
when there exists some fundamental
agreement among
major states within
the system on the objectives they are seeking to
uphold by participating in
it, when the structure of the system reflects
the way in which power is distributed among its
respective members and when agreed-upon
procedures exist for resolving differences among
them.
our actual experience is limited to the
operations
of a single system-the balance of power
system-operating either
within the "multipolar" configuration
that characterized international
politics until World War II, or the "bipolar"
configuration
that has characterized them since. Alternative
systems remain abstract conceptualizations in
the minds of theorists, and are of little use in
advancing our knowledge of how wars in the real
world do or do not occur.3 But "systems theory"
itself is something else again: here one can find
a useful point of departure for thinking about
the nature of international relations
since 1945.
An "international system" exists, political
scientists tell us, when two conditions are met:
first,
interconnections exist between units within
the system, so that changes in some parts of it
produce changes in other parts as well; and,
second,
the collective behavior of the system as a whole
differs from the expectations and priorities of
the individual units that make it Up.4 Certainly
demonstrating the "interconnectedness" of
post-World War II international relations is not
difficult: one of its most prominent
characteristics has been the tendency of
major powers to assume
that little if anything can
happen in the world without in some way
enhancing or detracting from their own
immediate interests.5 Nor has
the collective behavior of nations
corresponded to their individual expectations:
the very fact that the interim arrangements of
1945 have remained largely intact for four decades
would have astonished-and quite possibly
appalled-the
statesmen who cobbled them together in the
hectic months that followed the surrender of
Germany and Japan.6 A particularly valuable
feature of
systems theory is that it
provides criteria for differentiating between
stable and unstable political configurations:
these can help to account for the fact that
some international systems outlast others.
Karl
Deutsch and J. David Singer have
defined "stability" as "the probability that the
system retains all of its essential
characteristics: that no single nation becomes
dominant; that most of its members continue to
survive; and that large-scale war does not occur."
It is characteristic of such a system, Deutsch
and Singer add, that it has the
capacity for self-regulation: the ability to
counteract stimuli that would otherwise threaten
its survival, much as the automatic pilot on an
airplane or the governor on a steam engine would
do. "Self-regulating" systems are very different
from what they call "self-aggravating" systems,
situations that get
out of control, like forest fires, drug
addiction, runaway inflation, nuclear fission,
and of course, although they themselves do not
cite the example, all-out war.7
Self-regulating mechanisms are most likely to
function, in turn,
when there exists some fundamental
agreement among
major states within
the system on the objectives they are seeking to
uphold by participating in
it, when the structure of the system reflects
the way in which power is distributed among its
respective members and when agreed-upon
procedures exist for resolving differences among
them.
Crowley, page 236
Advising Chinese leaders that the Soviets were
determined to amass enough nuclear weapons to
destroy their country,
Kissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite
information.
“We would be prepared, at your request, through
whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever
information we have about the disposition of
Soviet forces,” Kissinger told Huang Hua, the
Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in
1971.108 The specific reference was
to Soviet forces deployed during the war that
year between India and Pakistan, but Kissinger’s
offer was meant to lay the groundwork for a
broader proposal of assistance. I
determined to amass enough nuclear weapons to
destroy their country,
Kissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite
information.
“We would be prepared, at your request, through
whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever
information we have about the disposition of
Soviet forces,” Kissinger told Huang Hua, the
Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in
1971.108 The specific reference was
to Soviet forces deployed during the war that
year between India and Pakistan, but Kissinger’s
offer was meant to lay the groundwork for a
broader proposal of assistance. I
Advising Chinese leaders that the Soviets were
determined to amass enough nuclear weapons to
destroy their country, Henry
Kissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite
information and a hot line long before the
communist government gained American diplomatic
recognition, according to transcripts of
conversations about to be released.
"We would be prepared, at your request, through
whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever
information we have about the disposition of
Soviet forces," Kissinger told Huang Hua, the
Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in
1971. He was referring
to Soviet forces deployed during the war that
year between India and Pakistan.
determined to amass enough nuclear weapons to
destroy their country, Henry
Kissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite
information and a hot line long before the
communist government gained American diplomatic
recognition, according to transcripts of
conversations about to be released.
"We would be prepared, at your request, through
whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever
information we have about the disposition of
Soviet forces," Kissinger told Huang Hua, the
Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in
1971. He was referring
to Soviet forces deployed during the war that
year between India and Pakistan.
Crowley, page 242
AP, 1999
Briefing Chou on the Soviets on November 10, 1973 in the Great Hall of the People, Kissinger repeated that it was in the interests of the United States to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack on China. “They want us to accept the desirability of destroying China’s nuclear capability,” Kissinger said. Instead, he offered China secret military cooperation with the United States, including “ideas on how to lessen the vulnerability of your forces and how to increase the warning time” before a Soviet attack.
Briefing Chou on the Soviets on November 10, 1973, in the Great Hall of the People, Kissinger said it was in the interests of the United States to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack on China. "They want us to accept the desirability of destroying China's nuclear capability," Kissinger said, according to a transcript of the conversation. Instead, he offered China secret military cooperation with the United States, including "ideas on how to lessen the vulnerability of your forces and how to increase the warning time" before a Soviet attack.
Crowley, page 243
AP, 1999
He met with Kissinger several additional times to discuss the hotline to provide China with strategic U.S. intelligence information, but the Chinese ultimately did not respond to the offer.
While Chou was interested in the proposal and met with Kissinger several times to discuss a hot line to provide China with strategic U.S. intelligence information, the Chinese did not respond to the offer, William Burr wrote in a commentary on the transcripts.
Crowley, page 195-196
The first was the emphasis
on structure, the
achievement and preservation of which came about
by
cultivating
certain behavior of the principal actual and
potential participants and giving them a stake in
the system. In a balance of power system, only the
large, capable nations matter,
because only they can have enough of a stake in
the system and enough resources to maintain it
by exercising self-restraint and by restraining,
deliberately or implicitly, the
conduct of other nations.
The second tendency of dealing
flexibly and directly with the major adversaries
was one
of maneuver. It was based on
an attempt to create a more subtle and dynamic
balance, rather than dealing through formal
alliances and their attendant problems
of attaining consensus, potential
subversion and vetoes
by allies, and free-riding. It also made
allowances for
dealing in partial alignments, such, as America’s
tacit defense
of China’s northern border against the Soviet
Union. These two tendencies—structure
(great power politics) and maneuver (flexible
diplomacy)—described a balance of power policy
that was set into motion deliberately by the
administration in order to better cope with
shifts in the international environment and
domestic pressures.
Two characteristics could be discerned, which
equated roughly to a balance of power perspective
and a balance of power world:
the first was the stress
on "structure" and its
achievement and preservation through
cultivating a
certain behavior of the principal actual and
potential participants, and giving them a stake in
the system. In a balance of power system only the
large, capable nations "count,"
because only they can have enough of a stake in
the system and enough resources to maintain the
system,
by exercising self-restraint and by restraining,
deliberately or implicitly, the exaggerated
conduct of other.
The second characteristic was the propensity to
deal
flexibly and directly with the major adversaries.
This constituted a policy
of maneuver,
an attempt to create a more subtle and dynamic
balance, rather than dealing through formal
alliances, with the burden
of attaining consensus, the risks of leaks or
subversion
by allies, the sufferance of vetoes by inferior
and otherwise ineffectual powers, and the
incurring of debts in return for support. It also
constituted
dealing in partial alignments, such as America's
tacit reinsurance
of China's northern border against the USSR. The
two characteristics, structure
(great power politics) and maneuver (flexible
diplomacy), can be summed up in a single
proposition: The Nixon-Kissinger
administration deliberately moved to
rationalize relations with its two major
adversaries, with the foreseen-perhaps even
desired(l)- consequence of unsettling relations
with allies, and inspiring them to make further
moves that would increase their independence and
their distance from the United States,
attenuating at once their need for our support
and their claim on our support
equated roughly to a balance of power perspective
and a balance of power world:
the first was the stress
on "structure" and its
achievement and preservation through
cultivating a
certain behavior of the principal actual and
potential participants, and giving them a stake in
the system. In a balance of power system only the
large, capable nations "count,"
because only they can have enough of a stake in
the system and enough resources to maintain the
system,
by exercising self-restraint and by restraining,
deliberately or implicitly, the exaggerated
conduct of other.
The second characteristic was the propensity to
deal
flexibly and directly with the major adversaries.
This constituted a policy
of maneuver,
an attempt to create a more subtle and dynamic
balance, rather than dealing through formal
alliances, with the burden
of attaining consensus, the risks of leaks or
subversion
by allies, the sufferance of vetoes by inferior
and otherwise ineffectual powers, and the
incurring of debts in return for support. It also
constituted
dealing in partial alignments, such as America's
tacit reinsurance
of China's northern border against the USSR. The
two characteristics, structure
(great power politics) and maneuver (flexible
diplomacy), can be summed up in a single
proposition: The Nixon-Kissinger
administration deliberately moved to
rationalize relations with its two major
adversaries, with the foreseen-perhaps even
desired(l)- consequence of unsettling relations
with allies, and inspiring them to make further
moves that would increase their independence and
their distance from the United States,
attenuating at once their need for our support
and their claim on our support
Crowley, page 5
The apparently undesirable move of manipulating
or prolonging a
short-term conflict with another nation then
became useful in rallying
and maintaining public support for the basic
grand strategy.
or prolonging a
short-term conflict with another nation then
became useful in rallying
and maintaining public support for the basic
grand strategy.
The manipulation or extension of
short-term conflict with the other nation,
while not desirable on straightforward
international or domestic grounds,
became useful in gaining
and maintaining public support for the core
grand strategy.
short-term conflict with the other nation,
while not desirable on straightforward
international or domestic grounds,
became useful in gaining
and maintaining public support for the core
grand strategy.
Crowley, page 4
Christensen, 1996
Perceiving fundamental changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947 and Mao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around newly-designed long-term strategies to respond to those shifts and to preempt any resulting negative consequence.
Viewing basic changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947 and Mao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around long-term strategies, designed to respond to those shifts.
Crowley, page 165
James Reston once called it “the most unpopular
American war of this century”; a study group for
the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention o f Violence
declared that it “commanded
less popular support than any previous American
international war”; and journalist David Wise
stated that
the Vietnam war was
“the most unpopular war in [American] history.”
American war of this century”; a study group for
the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention o f Violence
declared that it “commanded
less popular support than any previous American
international war”; and journalist David Wise
stated that
the Vietnam war was
“the most unpopular war in [American] history.”
James Reston once called it "the most unpopular
American war of this century" a study group for
the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence has
de-clared that it "commands
less popular support than any previous American
international war"; and journalist David Wise has
disclosed that in
the Vietnam War, the nation entered
"the most unpopular war in its history."
American war of this century" a study group for
the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence has
de-clared that it "commands
less popular support than any previous American
international war"; and journalist David Wise has
disclosed that in
the Vietnam War, the nation entered
"the most unpopular war in its history."
Published January 12, 2017
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