(FORTUNE Magazine) – SHALL WE THINK this a failed career? When Warren E. Buffett, then 34, gained control of Berkshire Hathaway, a textile manufacturer, in 1965, the company had a net worth of $22 million and a stock price of $12 per share. Using a rivulet of cash flow from textiles to get started, Buffett gradually built Berkshire into a huge conglomerate that owns a string of businesses (among them several property and casualty insurance companies, See's Candies, the Buffalo News, World Book) and megaportions of such stock market successes as Capital Cities/ABC, Washington Post, Geico, and Coca-Cola. In Buffett's 25-year reign, Berkshire's net worth per share has compounded at a glossy rate of 23.8%, and total net worth is now $4.9 billion. The stock recently sold for $7,450 a share. That made the 44.7% interest that Buffett and his wife own worth $3.8 billion. Yet Buffett feels strongly that his fortune could have been still bigger had he not goofed quite so often. In the 1989 Berkshire annual report -- just published -- he presents ''Mistakes of the First Twenty-Five Years (A Condensed Version),'' a witty investment and management primer that we reprint here:

To quote Robert Benchley, ''Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down.'' Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.

-- My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business -- textile manufacturing -- to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal. If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the ''cigar butt'' approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the ''bargain purchase'' will make that puff all profit. Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original ''bargain'' price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces -- never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre. You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way -- in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras -- unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o -- three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song ''My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot.'' I could give you other personal examples of ''bargain purchase'' folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie ((Charles T. Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman)) understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stock, we look for first- class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.

-- That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand. I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: ''I was Snow White, but I drifted.''

-- A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers. The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled, as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo ((thereby challenging an established competitor)). In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and Geico. ((American Express shuddered in 1963 because a subsidiary was found to have certified the existence of mountainous quantities of salad oil that didn't exist. Geico barely dodged bankruptcy in 1976 because it had miscalculated its claim costs and was underpricing.)) Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.

-- My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call ''the institutional imperative.'' In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play. For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's first law of motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting compensation, or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated. Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.

-- After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner -- or investor -- can accomplish % wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person. -- Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.

-- Our consistently conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default. We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds -- and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds -- though we have learned to live with those also. We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this ((confession)) occupying many more pages than it does here.