(FORTUNE Magazine) – Nexis, as ever our guide to the prevalence of loaded phrases, reports 210 sightings of ''militarization of space'' (hereafter MOS) since 1986. Having now sampled the sightings quite extensively, we claim instant expertise on the connotations of the phrase and offer several fast reflections. -- The phrase is ordinarily used by folks assuming space to be currently virginal and professing to be horrified at the possibility of its corruption by militarists. -- People talking about the MOS problem almost invariably assume that the potential corruptors are Americanskis of the Star Wars persuasion, as in the earnest New York Times editorial the other day wistfully speculating that ''it's not too late for ((Reagan)) to leave a larger legacy than the militarization of space.'' -- The phrase recurs endlessly in East Bloc pronouncements -- our particular favorite in the genre being a joint Ethiopian-Rumanian statement putting the Mengistu-Ceaucescu axis squarely on record against MOS -- and the Russians have scored a huge propaganda triumph in persuading so many Westerners that the West itself is the problem.

-- The possibility that space is already militarized, and mainly by the Soviets, seems never to be contemplated in liberal circles. Our own exposure to the issue took place this past fall, when we did a part- time tour of duty as an editorial aide to the Commission on Integrated Long- Term Strategy. The commission, established by the Defense Department a year ago, comprises 13 citizens with assorted heavyweight backgrounds (among the commissioners: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski), and along the way it gave a great deal of thought to the dangers presented by Soviet advantages in space. We claim that its just-published report, entitled Discriminate Deterrence, is an ideal place to start if you wish to move rapidly past the baby talk on the subject. Control of space would be critical in any Soviet-American wars -- including conventional wars. Both sides would depend on space systems for communications and intelligence; they would often be the only means of tracking enemy troop movements and other preparations for an attack. An aggressor would obviously want to attack his enemy's systems at the outset of the war. So a secure satellite network is important for defensive forces. Says the commission report: ''The United States needs military satellite systems that will continue to function or can at least be reconstituted speedily . . .'' Space systems designed for peacetime operations might not be terribly useful in a wartime environment. The U.S. military satellites tend to be amazingly sophisticated and versatile, not to mention expensive, but they were designed mainly for peacetime operations. They are hard to protect. If they were destroyed in Soviet attacks, they would be hard to replace, given our minimal launch capability. Soviet satellites in contrast are generally less versatile but are better protected and -- given the huge Soviet launch potential -- far more replaceable. Says the commission report: ''The Soviets, far more than we, have designed their space systems for support of military operations in wartime.'' They are far more capable than we of attacking enemy satellites at all altitudes. The sole U.S. antisatellite design is for use at low orbits only, and testing it has been prohibited by Congress. ; The commission has put forward a number of detailed proposals for transforming this uneven matchup in space, but they will plainly take a while to implement. In the short run, we can hope mainly for some lower numbers in Nexis.